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INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FOR-PROFIT NURSING HOME:
SOME EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF INSIDE POWER RELATIONS
Cedric Herring
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
ABSTRACT
This paper offers a conceptual model for understanding
how and in what ways externally determined factors affect
power arrangements within a for-profit nursing home setting.
Specifically, this paper links the activities of nursing
homes as profit seekers to federal legislation and the
activities of strategically structured interests which seek
to socialize their costs. Additionally, it shows how social
distinctions and other factors which have their origins
external to the nursing home setting have consequences for
what takes place inside. The model posits that it is those
people who are members of society's more privileged groups
(professional white males) who will get access to positions
of power in part because members must go outside the
organization into the greater society to obtain the
certification which will allow them to occupy powerful
positions. Consequently, those who have power inside the
organization (professional white males) are very similar to
those who have power in the greater society. Moreover,
observational data indicate that those statuses which
members of the nursing home enter with are associated with
patterns of interaction and levels of control and authority.
Finally, there is an attempt to spell out the implications
of such findings and an attempt to show how government and
community (non) involvement (could) affect relationships
internal to the nursing home.
As Jansson (1979:362) suggests, "a crucial policy choice that
must be made by public agencies and officials is whether . . . to
provide publicly funded services themselves or to utilize
nonprofit or profit-oriented organizations in the private sector."
More and more often, policy makers are depending on the profit
oriented, private sector to provide social services; however, the
costs of providing such social services continue to be met by the
state (O'Connor, 1973).
Recently, theorists have attempted to outline the
consequences of capitalists' attempts to socialize their
production costs and expenses while keeping profits in their own
hands (e.g., O'Connor, 1973; Braverman, 1974). For example,
Braverman (1974:271) argues that to the extent that capitalists
are successful in passing their costs on to the state while
reaping profits "the capitalist mode of production takes over the
totality of individual, family, social needs, and in subordinating
them to the market, also reshapes them to serve the needs of
capital." He argues that with the transformation of the society
into a giant market which benefits state-subsidized capitalists,
the population no longer relies upon social organization in
the forms of family, friends, neighbors, community, elders,
children, but with few exceptions must go to market and only
to market, not only for food, clothing, and shelter, but
also for recreation, amusement, security, for the care of
the young, the old, the sick, the handicapped (Braverman,
1974:276).
Braverman goes on to argue that "since no care [for the young, the
old, the sick, and the handicapped] is forthcoming from the
community, and since the family cannot bear all such
encumbrances. . . the care of all these layers become
institutionalized" (p. 280).
Presumably, because these changes in the care of humans are
more often to meet the needs of capital than to benefit those who
make use of the services, the care for humans becomes more profit-
oriented and more removed from humanistic concerns. The care for
the young, the old, the sick, and the handicapped becomes more and
more the responsibility of total (care) institutions which seek
profit. But to see precisely what consequences this drive for
profit has, one must look inside the walls of those total
institutions which are profit-oriented.
While he is not specifically concerned with profit-oriented
total institutions, Goffman (1961) does look inside the walls of
-51-
total Institutions. In his works on total institutions--"places
of residence and work where a large number of like-situated
individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable
period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered
round of. life"--Goffman (1961:xiii) discusses the roles that
members of these institutions play. He points out that while many
of these roles appear to be "natural," they are for the most part
based on the ability of the various actors to make their
definitions (of what should be done) binding for others. Many of
these differences in ability to make binding definitions can be
explained in terms of differences in interaction patterns and
content of interactions (among inmates, between inmates and staff,
and among staff members). However, to understand why these
patterns of interaction exist and persist, it is often necessary
to look beyond the walls of the total institution in that the
total institution's internal structure reflects the dominant
values and priorities of the external society (Clegg and
Dunkerley, 1977; McNeil, 1978; Salaman, 1978). Moreover, the
distribution of resources, privilege, and control inside the
organization are related to the distribution of power in the
broader society (Alford, 1975; Wolff, 1977; Martin, 1980).
However, as Martin (1980) notes, studies of internal
organizational structure typically look at groups internal to the
organization and ignore linkages between them and others outside
the boundaries of the institution. As she notes, such views of
organizations are deficient.
In order to understand how a given total institution affects
the behaviors and relationships of its members, not only must one
look at the interpersonal interactions within that total
institution, but s/he must also examine those factors (mostly)
external to it which facilitate and reinforce what takes place
inside. Such an attempt is made here. This paper examines the
nursing home as a privately owned, profit-oriented, but largely
state-subsidized total institution. An attempt is made to
determine how (and to what extent) externally produced/determined
factors (e.g., organization of payments, demographic
characteristics of staff members, professional certifications,
governmental involvement, etc.) impact relationships within the
nursing home. Of special interest are those institutional
characteristics which are consequences of the nursing home's
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"free-market" profit orientation while receiving state subsidies.
NURSING HOMES AND THE STATE
In the past, shorter life spans made nursing homes and other
long-term care institutions virtually unnecessary. Brody (1977)
notes that the proportion of elderly people was not very large
before this century, and that it has been only in the past 50
years that a rapid increase in this proportion has occurred. She
states that "sheer demography, then, was one of the major
pressures producing growth of institutional facilities" (Brody,
1977:11).
But demography is not the total answer. As O'Connor
(1963:41) points out, "monopoly capital and labor also have
favored socializing social consumption expenditures such as
medical costs and workers' retirement income." Thus, they have
supported programs which have been important to the growth of
state-subsidized nursing homes: the Social Security Act in 1935,
the Hill-Burton Act in 1946, and Medicare and Medicaid in the
mid-1960's. Alford (1975) argues that there have also been
strategically structured interests in the health professions which
have historically fought for the passage of such legislation in
the form that it has eventually passed.
According to Reichert (1975), an important intent of the
Social Security Act was to take older people out of the job market
during the depression era. He argues that disruptions of the
extended family, housing shortages, and new mobility among wage
earners all increased the demand for nursing homes. However,
because the law prohibited payments to residents of public
institutions, people took their relief money and moved into
private homes. Typically, these nursing homes were unregulated
and often.of poor quality. Local and county governments entered
the picture by offering financial support to those facilities
which agreed to meet certain minimum requirements.
In 1946, the Hill-Burton Act was passed, guaranteeing that
those willing to build and operate nursing homes could be assured
of financial assistance from the federal government. Needless to
say, this gave (potential) owners of nursing homes more incentive
to go into business.
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In 1965, the Medicare and Medicaid amendments were added to
the Social Security Act. Among other things, these amendments
provided for coverage of medical payments for the elderly and the
indigent in extended care institutions and skilled nursing homes.
With the advent of Medicare and Medicaid payments for patients in
nursing homes, nursing home expenditures rose more than 500
percent from 1966 to 1975 (Gornick, 1976). For 1977, outlays for
nursing home-related costs reached $12.6 billion.
According to the National Center for Health Statistics (1978)
there were approximately 18,300 nursing homes in the U.S. as of
1977. Of these, over 70% were for-profit operations. These for-
profit homes owned approximately 70% of the 1,383,600 beds in
service. Though over 70% of nursing homes are profit-oriented, a
major source of funding for them has been and continues to be
federal-state cost sharing programs such as Medicaid and Medicare
which pay for many of the health care-related expenses of nursing
home patients.
In 1977 for example, the average total monthly charge for
patients who used Medicare as their primary source of payment for
services in a profit-oriented nursing home was more than 75%
greater than total charges for patients who used their own money
to pay for services in nonprofit and government nursing homes
($754 per month compared to $427 per month).
Clearly then, the state's involvement has facilitated the
growth and profitability of the nursing home industry. But the
(non) intervention of the state and the greater society also
affects other aspects of the nursing home. The remainder of this
paper will examine some of those factors which originate outside
the boundaries of the nursing home but have consequences for what
occurs within the walls of the nursing home. Much of what follows
is based on data collected from a case study of a profit-oriented,
state-subsidized nursing home.
METHOD
Data related to the interpersonal relationships within
profit-oriented nursing homes were collected as part of a case
study of Huron View Lodge (HVL) nursing home. The data were
collected from October of 1980 to April of 1981 using the
participant-as-observer technique, archival research, and
interviews. During the initial stages of the study, the
investigator assumed the role of a volunteer worker. Later (in
January) he revealed his "researcher identity."
While the participant observation techniques employed in this
study have some drawbacks, most notably generalizability, they
offered some definite advantages: They allowed the investigator an
opportunity to view behaviors of nursing home patients and staff
in the social context of the nursing home itself. They provided
him the chance to study patterns of interaction in more detail
than might have been possible using other methods. This method
also facilitated the use of controlled quasi-experiments in which
the investigator initiated actions. And finally, participant
observation, when combined with the archival data, enabled the
investigator to more fully understand the influence of the "social
structure" of the nursing home on the nursing home members.
FINDINGS
As mentioned, in order to understand the effects of the
institutional setting on behaviors and relationships, one should
consider factors both inside and outside the institution. Figure
1 presents a conceptual model of some of those factors which are
important to understanding how and in what ways externally
determined factors have effects within the institution.
Specifically, this model posits that it is those people who are
members of society's more privileged groups (professional white
males) who will get access to positions of power within the
institution. This is true because workers must go outside the
organization into the greater society in order to obtain
certification, a type of gatekeeping mechanism which allows only
the "worthy" to occupy powerful positions. Consequently, those
who have power inside the organization (professional white males)
are very similar to those who have power in the greater society.
For this reason, this model predicts that one's position inside
the institution will be a function of his/her status in the
society at-large. It is expected that power arrangements and
patterns of interaction, therefore, will parallel those found
beyond the walls of the institution.
The following four dimensions will be examined in this
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section of this paper: (1) the characteristics of the institution,
(2) characteristics of members which exist prior to and external
to the nursing home setting, (3) types and patterns of interaction
which take place within the walls of the nursing home, and (4) the
extent to which institutional labels and identities are promoted,
facilitated, and reinforced by the state and the general society.
Kart and Manard (1976) concluded that ownership type, size of
facility, demographic composition of membership, and
professionalism of staff were determinants of the quality of care
that nursing home patients would receive. While no inferences
about the quality of care will be (explicitly) made here, such
information will be presented.
First (and probably foremost), Huron View Lodge (HVL) nursing
home is a profit-oriented, but heavily state-subsidized
institution. It is a family-owned corporation with two co-
owners. Not unlike many businesses, HVL is a member of the local
Chamber of Commerce; moreover, it holds certificates of membership
to the National Association of Nursing Homes, the Michigan
Hospital Association, the Association of Health Care Homes, and
the American Health Care Association.
Huron View Lodge, a 71-bed facility, is slightly larger than
the average privately owned, profit-oriented nursing home facility
which has approximately 63 beds(NCHS, 1978:Table 142). It is a
skilled nursing facility which offers speech therapy, physical
therapy, occupational therapy, X-ray facilities, and scheduled
diversional activities to patients. (In February, 1981) HVL's rate
of full-time or equivalent employees (FTE) providing direct
health-related services per 100 beds, 59.2 was also higher than
the average facility's 45.1. The composition of its staff by
professional status, race, and sex is presented in Table 1.
In trying to determine patterns of interaction, dominance,
and social control, one is well-advised to remember that members
in total institutions "typically have statuses and relationships
in the outside that must be taken into consideration," for as
Goffman (1961:76, 122) points out, "there will always be . . .
some use made of social distinctions already established in the
environing society. . . . " With this in mind, it is reasonable to
expect that a member's status external to HVL is a determinant of
Table 1.
Composition of Staff by Professional Status, by Race, and by Sex
Professional Status (N-81) Percent
Professionals 21
Nonprofessionals 79
Race (N=81)
Blacks 37
Whites 63
Sex (N-81)
Males 32
Females 68
his/her status inside the nursing home. For this reason, it was
hypothesized that the amount of control --ability to make rules
which are binding for oneself and other institution members --
* one has within the confines of the nursing home is related to
factors such as his/her professional status, race and sex which
originate external to the nursing home . This hypothesis is
consistent with the conceptual model presented in Figure 1 and
will act as a (partial) test of this model. Data relevant to
testing this hypothesis are presented in Table 2 in terms of
percentages of staff members with much control as a function of
professional status, race, and sex.
The results from this analysis suggest that externally
originating statuses are related to levels of control. For
example, at HVL, no black males (0%) have much control, 5% of the
black females have much control, 29% of the white males have much
control, and 53% of the white females have much control. While it
is likely that much of the difference in level of control can be
attributed to the proporlion of each subpopulation which has
professional status (all X 's are statistically significant at
p<.0l), it should be noted that the strength of association
between levels of control and professional status varies from one
subpopulation to the next. For example, for black females, there
is a perfect association between professional status and level of
control; i.e., the Goodman-Kruskal lambda and Cramer's phi
TABLE 2.
fercentaae with Much Control by Professional Status. Race. and Sex
RACE
STATUS
NONPRO
BLACK
MALE
0%
(n-9)
SEX
FEMALE
0%(n-'20)
WHITE TOTAL
SEX
MALE -'FEMALE
8% 36%
(nm13) (n-22)
14%
(n-64)
PRO -- 100% 100% 83% 88%
(n-O) (n-1) (n-4) (n12) (n=17)
TOTAL 0% 5% 29% 53% 30%
(n-g) (n-21) (n-17) (n-34) (N-81)
No Measures %& -100% %k -92% %A -47%
of Association X2" -8.0 X -13.5 X2  z7.4
are possible df -1 I df a1 df a1
Lamdaml.0 Lamda- .80 Lamda- .38
Phi -1.0 Phi - .86 Phi - .45
p-vali .01 p-val .01 P-vaOf .01
)
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measures of association are equal to 1.0. The lambda and phi for
status predicting control for white males are .80 and .86
respectively. For status predicting control for white females,
lambda= .38 and phi= .45. Because there are no black males at HVL
who hold positions with professional status, there are no measure
of association between status and control for this subpopulation.
These findings are important to the extent that those with
much control can and do define organizational goals and are able
to use organizational resources for their personal and
professional interests. In the case of HVL, the most powerful
determinant of having much control is one's professional status.
As Alford (1975) points, because of licensing practices of
the government, such professionals are virtually guaranteed a
monopoly on certain kinds of decisions and policies.
These professional monopolists . . . are able to provide a
symbolic screen of legitimacy while maintaining power in
their own hands through various organizational devices. A
continuous flow of symbols will reassure the funding of
allegedly controlling publics or constituencies about the
functions being performed, while the individuals or groups
which have a special interest in the income, prestige, or
power generated by the agency are benefitting from its
allocations of resources (Alford, 1975:194).
In other words, it is from the society external to the
nursing home that professionals derive their levels of control on
the inside. The same is true of other statuses, but only to a
lesser degree. To show just how these externally originating
differences are (become) relevant to patterns of interaction in
the nursing home, further analysis is provided.
Such findings are also important to understanding the
internal structure of HVL in that there is a profound hierarchical
division of authority, decision-making, and labor. While such
organizational structure is not peculiar to HVL, nor nursing homes
in general, in this particular setting it has some rather
interesting consequences for patient-staff and staff-staff
interactions. Most notably, because of this division of authority
and division of labor, and the existence of a "that's not my job"
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attitude toward providing services to patients, many of the wants
and some of the needs of the patients go unattended.
Unfortunately (at least from the patient's point of view),
decision-making on even the seemingly most trivial matters takes
hierarchical channels. As Perrow (1972:36) points out, "hierarchy
promotes delays and sluggishness; everything must be kicked
upstairs for a decision either because the boss insists or because
the subordinate does not want to take the risk of making a poor
decision." This is bad news for patients in that higher ups, who
usually have to give their approval on matters of immediate
concern to them, are more or less insulated from patients. Of
those whose jobs include interaction with patients, those with the
least control have the most contact with patients. As Table 3
shows, of those occupations which include contact with patients as
part of the job duties (this excludes maintenance workers), the
higher in the HVL hierarchy jobs are located, the more likely are
their incumbents to have little contact with patients . Table 3
presents staff member contact with patients in terms of
percentages with little contact by stratum in the HVL hierarchy.
Table 3.
Percentage With Little Contact by Stratum in the HVL Hierarchy
Stratum %With Little Contact
11%
Lowest (n-44)
29%
Middle (n-17)
33%
Highest (n-6)
16%
Total (N-67)
In addition to the fact that a staff member's contact with
patients is inversely related to his/her position in the HVL
hierarchy, Gottesman and Bourestom (1974) observed that only about
2 percent of patient contact with staff involved skilled nursing.
Moreover, they found that about 10 percent of the patients' time
was spent in contact with any staff member. One could argue that
this, at least in part, is also a result of nursing homes' drives
for efficiency and a reflection of their for-profit orientation.
For example, by using unskilled, low status, and low wage labor to
deal with patients, costs are reduced and profits are increased.
Moreover, these patterns of interaction can be explained by the
power of higher ups to define who should and should not attend to
the immediate day-to-day wants and needs of patients.
While higher ups, including the owners insulate themselves
from patients, they, nevertheless, have access to and are
accountable to funding sources. In the case of HVL, the major
funding source is the state. Figure 2 diagrams the authority
hierarchy at HVL. Under the current social organization,
patients, who occupy the lowest stratum of the HVL hierarchy, have
very little autonomy.
Barney (1974) points out the ineffectiveness of ordinary
regulatory mechanisms in dealing with a service such as nursing
home care, which has a relatively powerless people for a
clientele. She goes on to warn that profit-oriented nursing
homes, in seeking maximum efficiency and productivity, may take
advantage of patients who cannot defend their rights. From this,
it follows that the less powerful a patient is, the more likely
is the staff of the nursing home to take advantage of him/her .
At times, the fact (or even the notion) that a patient is
"confused" is used to disqualify his/her contentions. For
patients at HVL, the process of becoming "confused" is often a
labeling process in its most literal sense. Staff members
(nurses, nurses' aides, and orderlies) meet weekly to discuss the
eating habits, health statuses, moods, and behaviors of patients.
In these meetings, staff members recount the behaviors of patients
during that week, and patients are diagnosed as being "confused"
in much the same manner that one would be diagnosed as being
hypertensive. However, this particular diagnosis is more casual
though it has more far-reaching consequences for the powerlessness
of patients. For example, it often becomes convenient for the
staff to deny certain charges and occurrences by simply saying
that a patient is "just confused." While this label appears to
fit some times, at others, the patient's claims are not just
figments of his/her imagination. However, at this point, the
-62-
FIGURE 2.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE AUTHORITY HIERARCHY AT HVL
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patient's claim is often a moot question to the extent that the
label has been applied. This label In and of itself facilitates
the powerlessness of patients, and often offers them no recourse
but to accept injustices. So the accuracy or inaccuracy of the
label is irrelevant; it is the unchallenged power vested in that
staff to define who is or is not confused which is of consequence
for patient-staff interactions.
At HVL, the question of patient power becomes even more
clear-cut when money is involved: patients have virtually no say
in such matters. Even when it comes to money which the patients
own, the nursing home controls it. Patients may request their
money, but will receive it only with the approval of the financial
director or the owners, and only then if the financial director or
the owners find the reasons given for the request acceptable. For
example, one patient received $50 from his brother. He said that
he had had to turn this money over to the financial director. He
asked me to go get it for him because he just knew that they would
not give it back to him. I told a secretary in th business office
of the patient's request. She referred me to the financial
director. The financial director told me of all the paper work
involved, asked me why the patient wanted the money, etc.
However, she did refer me to one of the owners who happened to be
there on that day. The owner told me that there was just too much
hassle involved in getting the money to the patient for the
reasons given. He tried to convince me that I was showing too
much concern about how the patient would react. But finally, he
told me that I could go out and buy whatever the patient wanted,
and that HVL would reimburse me if I provided receipts. In this
instance, the wishes of the patient prevailed, but only with the
intervention of an outsider. What happens without such
intervention is clear: The requests of the patient are ignored.
Moreover, because the staff can view most patients as
nonpaying, incompetent, and/or unable to mobilize the resources
necessary to having their claims respected, they (the staff) can
ignore the requests of patients. Because the clientele at HVL are
rarely immediately responsible for meeting the financial
obligations to HVL themselves, the staff need not be very
responsive to the complaints, concerns, or wants of the clientele.
Moreover, at least some patients have problems with how their way
is being paid at HVL, and the organization of payments in general.
For example, one new patient was hesitant to eat a meal that was
placed in front of her. She "knew" that the food was not hers
because she had not paid for it. After a combination of
persuasion, an increase in her hunger, and a few cautious looks at
others eating, she ate, but not without continuously voicing her
reservations about her inability to pay. In short, because the
organization of payments is such that the cash nexus is hidden
from patients, few of them assert their consumerism or look into
alternatives; few of them feel like consumers or believe that they
have viable alternatives to living in the nursing home . Thus,
the nursing home staff need not view them as consumers, nor does
the staff need be responsive to patient claims.
However, because of its profit orientation, Huron View Lodge
is responsive to the complaints of the government and other
sources of funding. Thus, it follows that HVL need be responsive
to the demands of patients (only) to the extent that they are
viewed as a real source of funding. The more patients are
viewed as a source of funding, the more powerful they are, and
more responsive the nursing home is to their demands . However,
because the organization of payments is such that the
government , not the patient, is seen as the source of funding,
HVL can make profits at the expense of the state by minimally
meeting the state's requirements and not necessarily those of
patients.
The more direct funding the state gives to the nursing
home, the less patients are viewed as a source of funding, and the
less powerful patients are vis-a-vis others in the nursing home.
In other words, the state facilitates the powerlessness of
patients by granting funds directly to the nursing home. Instead
of giving patients more power, which would substantially
strengthen their position as consumers, the state often
strengthens the position of the nursing home by offering it "cost-
reimbursement packages" which protect it from risk of losses
(Enthoven, 1977)•
Figure 3 shows what the hierarchical structure of HVL might
look like if the social organizati-on were such that patients were
given the following "power subsidies": (1) direct payments to
them instead of to the nursing home, (2) the intervention of
parties who are sympathetic to patients and who do not have to
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FIGURE 3.
Conceptual Model of the HVL Hierarchy with Patient "Power Subsidies"
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rely on the nursing home for funding, and (3) the provision of
viable alternatives to living in nursing homes.
This diagram suggests a vast redistribution of authority (and
thus in autonomy) in favor of patients. Instead of being the most
dominated stratum of the hierarchy and being accountable to
virtually everyone at HVL, patients would probably be more like
real customers. Potentially, they would have more discretion in
how their lives are lived. Theoretically, they, with the help of
sympathetic allies, would have influence over the owners, to whom
other staff members at HVL are accountable. To the extent that
patient-staff relations at HVL are organized around money, they
would be less subdominant to staff members. Most importantly, if
need be, they would be more able to carry out their threats to
leave the nursing home to find better living arrangements. The
provision of alternatives would add substance to their threats of
leaving.
In addition to the government, other groups can (potentially)
affect relationships internal to the nursing home. As Barney
(1974) points out, community presence is a key to improved
conditions for patients. But as Newfield (1978) suggests, the
media and the public have a limited span of attention when it
comes to nursing homes. Only in the cases of scandal and horror
stories is the public concerned. Such attitudes in the general
society facilitate the patterns of interaction inside the nursing
home. As Newfield (1978) points out, nursing homes become state-
financed repositories of the old, the sick, and the handicapped
because of lax governmental regulation, family and community
noninvolvement, and unscrupulous, profit-seeking nursing home
owners.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This research on the nursing home as a privately owned,
profit-oriented, but largely state-financed institution was
undertaken with the conviction that such research is important but
more or less neglected. Most studies of nursing homes have looked
at either the quality of care within the nursing home, or have
addressed issues such as cost containment almost as if to separate
them from what goes on inside nursing homes. For the most part,
because of the nature of these studies, and the approaches they
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have used, issues dealing with the quality of care and costs have
been systematically separated.
However, because of the structural peculiarities of the
nursing home industry which stem from the fundamental structure of
American society, care of patients and other issues of staff-
patient interactions must not be separated from what goes on
outside the nursing home. This paper has tried to link the
activities of nursing homes as profit seekers to federal
legislation and the activities of strategically structured
interests which seek to socialize their costs. Additionally, an
attempt was made to show how factors which have their origins
outside the nursing home have consequences for what takes place
inside. Moreover, it was shown that those statuses which members
of the nursing home entered with were associated with patterns of
interaction and levels of control and authority within it. And
finally, there was an attempt to show how government and community
(non) involvement could potentially affect relationships internal
to the nursing home.
As previously noted, the structural peculiarities of the
nursing home industry (a "free-market," profit orientation while
receiving funding from the state) have made it difficult to
separate issues of cost-efficiency from issues of quality of care
within these institutions. But the relationship between "costs"
and "quality" are not necessarily as one would expect. Because
providers of nursing home care are generally reimbursed for
whatever costs they incur rather than on the basis of a standard
rate, there is neither reward for cost-efficiency nor penalty for
waste. Meanwhile, as profit seekers, there is little incentive
for them to provide a quality of service beyond the minimum which
will guarantee them a profit. For many other kinds of services,
these issues of costs and quality can be resolved in the
marketplace: people simply reveal their preferences by how they
spend their money. But in the case of the nursing home industry,
in which the state pays the costs of services provided, the
nursing home is not overly dependent on those who make use of its
facilities for its funding. Thus, it is not necessary for nursing
homes to view patients as consumers who are to be satisfied. They
only need to be responsive to the requirements of the state and
have their beds filled in order to secure profits. In short,
under the current organization of payments, nursing homes can make
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profits at the expense of the state by only minimally meeting the
state's requirements (and not necessarily those of patients who
make use of these services).
The problem of public policy design is to define the
appropriate role for government to achieve desirable social
purposes most effectively. If a desired goal is to improve the
quality of life for the elderly, the sick, and the handicapped
while reducing (or at least containing) costs, and if it is not
(necessarily) desirable to increase the profits of nursing home
owners, then clearly the strategy currently in use is flawed. To
correct this, the government must provide more alternatives (such
as community-based adult day care, home health care services,
homemaker services, and communal living arrangements) to those who
would usually end up in institutions. A threat is only as good as
its ability to be carried through; therefore, it is up to those on
the outside to make sure that a patient's threat to leave the
confines of a nursing home can be acted out if necessary by making
provisions for alternatives. Direct payment, as opposed to the
current organization of payments, provide the potential for
alternatives to those who might seek them. For those who do
become institutionalized, the state and others can facilitate
their receiving better quality treatment by insuring that nursing
homes become not only for-profit, but also for- service -
oriented.
NOTES
1Staff members with little control are those who have no
supervisory nor policy-setting duties as part of their jobs; staff
members with much control are those who do have supervisory and/or
policy-setting capacities as part of their jobs. Because of the
research methods employed, all data statistically analyzed are
'objective," i.e., coded according to observable (nonattitudinal)
criteria.
2
Rather than just detractina from the explanatory powers
of Table 2, the existence of zero cells adds substantively to the
meaning of the table and gives greater insight into the power
relationships in the nursing home; that is, it is shown that there
is no such thing as a black male with professional status at HVL.
Moreover, there are no black males at HVL who have much control.
Conversely, there are no white males who hold positions with
professional status and do not have much control. All
professionals, except for some of the white females, have much
control in this setting.
3A logit analysis of Table 2 (not presented here) indicates
that professional status, race, and sex are all related to one's
level of control at HVL. There is an interactive effect for
professional white females which predicts that they will have
lower levels of control than other professionals in the nursing
home setting. When one statistically controls the simultaneous
effects of these variable, the following coefficients and equation
result:
Log Odds (Much Control)- (1Ali3 x (-2.55 + 1.89STATUS + 1.51RACE +
.60sEx - 98 NTERACTION )
when
1 Professional
STATUS= 0 Otherwise
1 White
RACE= 0 Otherwise
1 Female
SEX= 0 Otherwise
1 White Professional Female
INTERACTION= 0 Otherwise
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